In a potential reversal of recent structural trends, there’s a small chance of something we haven’t seen since 1952.
Over the last few decades, we’ve gotten accustomed to the idea that Democrats could easily win the popular vote but struggle to win control of government.
This time, there’s a chance of a reversal. After years of winning without carrying the popular vote, Republicans might just need to win the most votes to win the House in 2022. There’s even a small chance of something we haven’t seen since 1952: Republicans winning the most votes, but failing to win control of government.
If you’re finding that a little hard to believe, you’re not alone. I struggled to make sense of it when I first reached these calculations myself. After all, gerrymandering does tilt the House slightly toward Republicans, even if nowhere near as much as it once did.
But FiveThirtyEight has reached a similar conclusion, with Republicans “favored to win a majority of seats if they win the popular vote by at least 0.4 points.” (These types of estimates are very imprecise — even one race going a little better than expected for Republicans could be enough to upset that kind of balance.)
One reason Democrats could pull this off is mundane: the number of races contested by only one of the major parties. This cycle, there are about twice as many races without a Democratic candidate as without a Republican one. Democrats won’t have candidates in about two dozen races, compared with about a dozen for Republicans. No one in South Dakota or North Dakota wanted to run for the House as a Democrat, apparently.
In all of these races, Democrats aren’t winning popular votes at all, blunting their usual popular vote strength without taking any toll on their chances in the districts that count. This might seem like a cheap way for Republicans to improve their odds at “winning” the popular vote, but that’s how the popular vote tallies for the House are recorded.
A second reason is a little more serious: Democrats have the incumbency advantage in a few more of the most pivotal races than Republicans do. And the Republican advantage on the map is so flimsy — just a few seats — that this type of Democratic edge in a few races can make a difference.
To take an example, let’s zoom in on the median district: Michigan’s Eighth House District. If Democrats win Michigan’s Eighth and every district more Democratic, they win the House; if Republicans win Michigan’s Eighth and every district more Republican, they win the House. The area that represents the new map of the district voted for President Biden by just 2.1 points in 2020, less than his 4.5-point victory in the national popular vote. That gap — 2.4 points — between Michigan’s Eighth and the nation as a whole is, in theory, the reason you might expect it to be likelier for Republicans to win the House while losing the popular vote than the other way around.
But much of the territory of what will be Michigan’s Eighth is represented by Dan Kildee, a Democrat. On average, incumbents typically fare about two or three percentage points better than nonincumbent candidates from the same party in similar races. Mr. Kildee has done even better than that: In 2020, he won his old district (Michigan’s Fifth) by more than 12 points, even as Mr. Biden won it by four. Even if Mr. Kildee runs only two points better next month instead of eight, more like an average incumbent, that alone might be enough to cancel out the gap between the expected result in his district and the national vote. A pretty sizable amount of the Republican structural advantage would be canceled out.
Zooming back out, there are 26 districts within the typical incumbency advantage — roughly 2.5 points — of the median district. Twelve of those districts are represented by Democrats, compared with seven for Republicans. It’s not much, but in those races — including in the median district — Democratic incumbents are poised to undo part of what remains of the Republican edge.
Zooming even further out, there are two even more Republican-friendly districts — Alaska’s At-Large and Ohio’s Ninth — where a Democratic incumbent is considered a favorite (rated as “lean” Democratic) by one of the major rating organizations. (The Democrat Mary Peltola recently edged Sarah Palin in a special election in Alaska that used ranked-choice voting.)
In these races, there’s a legitimate chance that Republicans could forfeit much of what remains of their structural advantage. There’s not really any equivalent on the other side: Although Republicans are highly competitive in a handful of similarly challenging districts on more Democratic-friendly turf (like California’s 22nd or Ohio’s First), none of these races seem in danger of falling quite as far out of reach. The better analogy to those races might be places like Maine’s Second and Pennsylvania’s Eighth, where Democrats are competitive on similarly Republican turf.
In the scheme of things, a race here and there might not seem like much. But as we discussed recently, the Republican structural edge is pretty shaky — it’s only about three seats, at least judged by how many districts are better or worse for Democrats than the nation as a whole. A few races here or there could easily be enough not just to overcome the underlying Republican advantage, but also to reverse it.
The final factor is turnout. Black and Latino turnout tends to drop in midterm elections, especially in noncompetitive and heavily Democratic Black and Hispanic districts in noncompetitive states like California, Illinois and New York. Lower nonwhite turnout would dampen Democratic margins in the national vote compared with a presidential election, which is the usual benchmark for judging structural bias. But it would do so without hurting Democratic chances quite as much in the relatively white districts likeliest to decide control of Congress.
It’s hard to say with much confidence how much this turnout factor could help Democrats erase their usual structural disadvantage. We’ll find out in November. But it has the potential to be a big factor. Even if, hypothetically, every district were contested by both parties, the usual midterm turnout disparity and the Democratic incumbency edge could be enough to flip around the usual Democratic disadvantage in translating popular votes to seats.
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October 11, 2022 at 04:00PM
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Why Republicans Could Prevail in the Popular Vote but Lose in the House - The New York Times
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